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Abstract. The concept of multivariate bijective map of
an affine space Kn over commutative Ring K was already used
in Cryptography. We consider the idea of nonbijective multivari-
ate polynomial map Fn of K
n into Kn represented as ”partially
invertible decomposition” F
(1)
n F
(2)
n . . . F
(k)
n , k = k(n), such that
knowledge on the decomposition and given value u = F (v) allow
to restore a special part v′ of reimage v. We combine an idea of
”oil and vinegar signatures cryptosystem” with the idea of linguistic
graph based map with partially invertible decomposition to intro-
duce a new cryptosystem. The decomposition will be induced by
pseudorandom walk on the linguistic graph and its special quotient
(homomorphic image). We estimate the complexity of such general
algorithm in case of special family of graphs with quotients, where
both graphs form known families of Extremal Graph Theory. The
map created by key holder (Alice) corresponds to pseudorandom se-
quence of ring elements. The postquantum version of the algorithm
can be obtained simply by the usage of random strings instead of
pseudorandom.
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1. On multivariate cryptography
and special multivariate transformations
Multivariate cryptography (see [4]) is one of the directions of Postquan-
tum Cryptography, which concerns with algorithms resistant to hypothetic
attacks conducted by Quantum Computer. The encryption tools of Multi-
variate Cryptography are nonlinear multivariate transformations of affine
space Kn, where K is a finite commutative ring. Nowadays this modern
direction of research requires new examples of algorithms with theoretical
arguments on their resistance to attacks conducted by ordinary computer
(Turing machine) and new tasks for cryptanalists.
Essential part of known results on Multivariate Cryptography is de-
voted to studies of quadratic encryption maps. For instance, for many mod-
ifications of Imai - Matsumoto Cryptosystems the successful cryptanalisis
was found.
The idea of the usage of nonbijective quadratic maps were proposed
in “unbalanced oil and vinegar” system. Nowadays this idea is strongly
supported by publication [3] devoted to security analisis of direct attacks
on modified unbalanced oil and vinegar systems. It looks like such sys-
tems and rainbow signatures schemes may lead to promising Public Key
Schemes of Multivariate Encryption (see [17], [18]).
In current paper we proposed different approach. The principle differ-
ence of our examples is that the degree of polynomial map is > 3. We will
seriously modify approach of [26] for the creation of bijective map of Kn,
where K is a general commutative ring, with invertible decomposition.
The modifications allow us to produce nonbijective maps of Kn. suitable
for the construction of multivariate cryptosystems. In difference with
”unbalanced oil and vinegar” method the partition of variables is defined
by homomorphism of algebraic graphs. We will analyze the options of
direct attacks attacks in future publications.
Recall, that Cremona group C(Kn) is a totality of invertible maps f
of affine space Kn over a Commutative ring K into itself, such that the
inverse map f−1 is also a polynomial one.
Let us refer to the sequence of general polynomial maps Fn on K
n,
n = 1, 2, . . . as a family of polynomial degree, if the degree of each trans-
formation is a parameter s of the size O(nt).
We say that a family Fn, n = 1, 2, . . . is a family of linear degree in
the case t = 1. We refer to a family Fn as a family of bounded degree
if t = 0. Assume that a transformation F = Fn is written in the form:
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xi → f
n
i (x1, x2, . . . , xn), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where each f
n
i ∈ K[x1, x2, . . . , xn]
is determined by the list of their monomial terms with respect to some
chosen order.
We refer to the sequence Fn ∈ C(K
n) as a family of polynomial density
d if total quantity of all monomial expressions within all fni is given as
O(nd) for some independent constant d.
Proposition 1. Let Fn, n = 1, 2, . . . be a family of polynomial degree s
and of polynomial density d. Then the value of Fn in the point x ∈ K
n
can be computed by O(ns+d) elementary steps.
A family of elements Fn ∈ C(K
n), n > 1 is called stable if each
multiple iteration of Fn with itself has degree 6 degFn.
We say that a family Fn ∈ C(K
n) has an invertible decomposi-
tion of speed d if Fn can be written as a composition of elements
F
(1)
n , F
(2)
n , . . . , F
(k)
n , k = k(n) and this decomposition will allow us to
compute the value of y = Fn(x) and the re-image of given y in time
k(n)O(nd) (see [26] which partially reflects authors talk at the Central
European Conference on Cryptology 2014).
The idea of usage of nonbijective polynomial transformations of Kn
onto Kn is already known. For instance, well known multivariate con-
struction of ” oil and vinegar variables” were presented by J. Patarin [16].
This scheme and its modifications (unbalanced oil and vinegar system, in
particular) were investigated in [5], [6], [2].
Below we introduce the simplest method of convertion of a computable
bijective map with invertible decomposition into nonbijective family with
partially computable decomposition.
Let us assume that Kn is presented as direct sum of affine subspaces
W1 and W2. We say that the family of multivariate map Fn : K
n → Kn
has partialy invertible decomposition Fn = F
(1)
n F
(2)
n . . . F
(k)
n , k = k(n)
if the knowledge on this presentation allows to find the projection π of
reimage v of Fn(v) = u onto subspace W1 in polynomial time.
Let us assume that nonlinear transformations Fn form a family of
polynomial degree and density. Assume that it has partially invertible
decomposition. Alice keeps this decomposition secret. She makes the
map Fn, given in standard form, and the partition onto W1 and W2
(in chosen special basis) public. Public user Bob writes his message
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pm), where m = m(n) = dim(W1). He writes a pseu-
dorandom string (r1, r2, . . . , rt), t = t(n) = dim(W2), He forms vector
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v = (p1, p2, . . . , pm, r1, r2, . . . , rt), t +m = n. Bob computes c = Fn(v)
and sends it to Alice.
Alice uses the knowledge on decomposition (private key) to compute
the plaintext (p1, p2, . . . , pm).
First, we consider an affine deformation of a multivariate family Fn :
Kn → Kn of polynomial density and polynomial degree: Let T1 and T2
be affine transformation of an Kn, i. e. polynomial maps of Kn into Kn
of degree one. We refer to Gn = T1FnT2 as affine deformation of the
family Fn. We say, that affine transformation is a regular one if the family
of Gn is also a family of polynomial degree and polynomial density. In
the simplest case, when degree of Fn is bounded by independent constant,
an arbitrary deformation is a regular one. If T1 is monomial map, i.e. it is
a composition of diagonal and permutational linear transformation, then
arbitrary affine deformation of such kind will be regular one.
Let Fn be a multivariate map of polynomial degree, polynomial density
with invertible decomposition F
(1)
n F
(2)
n . . . F
(k)
n , k = k(n). Let W1 be
invariant subspace for Fn and nonbijective linear transformation T1.
Assume, that T1|W2 is nonbijective linear transformation, τ2 is a bi-
jective affine transformation of Kn. Let e1, e2, . . . , em be the basis of W1
and em+1, em+2, . . . , en be the basis ofW2 is its completion to the basis of
Kn. Then T1FnT2 has partially invertible decomposition T1f1f2 . . . fkT2.
Really, if Gn(v) = u is given, then the knowledge on the decomposition
allows us to make the following steps.
1) Compute T−12 (u) = u
′.
2) Compute the reimage z of u′ for Fn for which Fn(z) = u
′.
3) Let T−1 be the inverse of T = T1|W1 .
4) Take z′ = z|W1 and compute p = T
−1(z′), which coincides with the
projection v|W .
We use the linguistic graphs and their special quotients to generate
families of multivariate maps with partially invertible decomposition by
the described above general scheme.
2. On linguistic graphs
as tools of multivariate cryptography
The motivation of linguistic graph came from the observation that
the restrictions of the incidence relation of geometry of simple group of
Lie type on disjoint union of two maximal Schubert cell can be given via
triangular system of algebraic equations (see [23], [24], [28]). Walks in
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linguistic graphs have been used for the creation of stream ciphers since
1998. The first examples of such ciphers are given in [27],[29],[30]. For the
estimation of the security level and feasibility studies for key exchange
protocols the symbolic computations are very useful. After presentation
of graph based bijective enciphering transformation as standard map H
of kind
z1 → h1(z1, z2, . . . , zn),
z2 → h2(z1, z2, . . . , zn),
. . . , (1)
zn → hn(z1, z2, . . . , zn)
one can evaluate its degree (see [43], [44]). Other parameters such as
order, number of fixed points, cycle structures can be investigated via
numerical (non symbolic) computations.
The recent results on stream ciphers and key exchange protocols the
reader can find in surveys [32,34,36,41,42] (see also [8, 10–12,19–22,33,
35,38–40]).
We will use walks in incidence structures corresponding linguistic
graphs and their flags as tools for generation of noninvertible transforma-
tion of flag variety. For this purpose we take a special homomorphic image
Γ1 (symplectic quotient) of linguistic graph Γ defined over commutative
ring K. Flag space of Γ2 can be identified with affine space K
n. Element π
of symmetric group Sn acting naturally on K
n shifts symplectic quotient
Γ1 of Γ2 to the symplectic quotient Γ1
pi of “deformated” linguistic graph
Γpi2 . Pair Γ1, Γ2 defines the partition of flag space K
n into direct sum of
W1 = K
n˜ and W2 = K
n−n˜.
The key owner Alice will create a public rule as a composition of
the most preferable singular linear map T1 with invariant space W1 such
that T1|W1 is invertible, some permutation π ∈ Sn, nonlinear map N
corresponding to the chosen walk on the flags of incidence structure Γpi2 ,
and the “shutter” T2, which is invertible affine transformation of K
n.
Alice will use tools of Computer Algebra to generate the composition in
the standard form (1).
A public user Bob will use “window” W1 to write his plaintext m
and W2 to put pseudorandom string v of elements from K. He gets
a randomised plaintext m˜ as concatenation of m and v. He computes
ciphertext c = H(m˜) and sends it to Alice.
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The private key of Alice consists of symplectic pair I, I ′ of linguistic
graphs, linear maps T1 and π, chosen pseudorandom walk in Γ
pi
2 and “the
shutter” T2. It allows her to restore the plaintext m, but not a random
string v.
Notice, that transformation H is a composition of linear map T
′
1 = T1π,
nonlinear map N and affine shutter T2. So it has similarity with Imai
Matsumoto encryption map (see [9]). If K = Ql Alice can “hide” ring
K and write public rule transformation Qnl with the modified trick of
Imai-Matsumoto algorithm.
Section 2 is devoted to the concept of the pair consisting of a linguistic
graph and its symplectic quotient. In section 3 we consider a general
scheme of generation of pseudo public multivariate map on variety of
vertices (or flags) of general linguistic graph. We use term pseudo public
because the complexity and level of security depends on the choice of
the graph. The idea of this method of symbolic walks on algebraic graph
encryption (shortly SWAGE) is presented in [31] together with an example
for the case of known linguistic graphs of large girth D(k, q) and their
generalisation for the case of general commutative ring (see also [30]
for the D(k, q) graphs case). The final form of SWAGE on numerical
level is presented in [40] together with the generalised method for special
incidence structures of arbitrary rank. In section 3 the reader can find
SWAGE descryption given both on symbolic and numerical methods.
So, the method of generation of nonlinear map as mentioned above map
N and computation of N−1 is given. Detailed descryption of general
algorithm for the case of K = Ql is given. The section 3 is devoted to the
examples of cryptosystems. We use the known graphs of large girthD(k, q)
([13], [14], [15]) and extremal graphs A(k, q)( see [38], [20], [41], [42]) and
there generalisations D(k,K) and A(k,K), where K is commutative ring.
Incidence structure Γ2 will correspond to representative of graphs from
family D(k,K), n = 2, 3, . . . and linguistic quotient Γ1 corresponds to
some graph from the family A(k′,K). The degrees of obtained public
keys will be evaluated by some constants. The last section contains some
remarks on the main results of the previous sections.
3. Linguistic graphs and their symplectic quotients
The missing definitions of graph-theoretical concepts which appear
in this paper can be found in [1]. All graphs we consider are simple , i.e.
undirected without loops and multiple edges. Let V (G) and E(G) denote
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the set of vertices and the set of edges of G, respectively. Then |V (G)|
is called the order of G, and |E(G)| is called the size of G. When it is
convenient we shall identify G with the corresponding anti-reflexive binary
relation on V (G), i.e. E(G) is a subset of V (G)× V (G) and write v G u
for the adjacent vertices u and v (or neighbors). We assume that V (G) is
a finite or an infinite set. The majority of examples will be locally finite
graphs G, i.e. each vertex v has finite number of neighbours (x ∈ V (G),
such that xG v). We refer to |{x ∈ V (G)|xG v}| as degree of the vertex v.
The sequence of distinct vertices v0, v1, . . . , vt, such that vi G vi+1 for
i = 1, . . . , t − 1 is the path in the graph. A path in G is called simple
if all its vertices are distinct. The graph is connected if each two of its
vertices are joined by some path. The length of a path is a number of its
edges. The distance between two vertices u and v of the graph, denoted by
dist(u, v), is the length of the shortest path between them. The diameter
of the graph, denoted by diam(G), is the maximal distance between two
vertices u and v of the graph. Let Cm denote the cycle of lengthm, i.e. the
sequence of distinct vertices v0, . . . , vm such that viGvi+1, i = 1, . . . ,m−1
and vm G v1. The girth of a graph G, denoted by g = g(G), is the length
of the shortest cycle in G.
The incidence structure is the set V with partition sets P (points)
and L (lines) and symmetric binary relation I such that the incidence
of two elements implies that one of them is a point and another one is a
line. We shall identify I with the simple graph of this incidence relation
(bipartite graph).
We refer to a triple consisting of set V , its partition V = P ∪ L and
symmetric and antireflexive binary relation I (incidence) on the set V ,
such that xIy implies x ∈ P , y ∈ L or x ∈ L and y ∈ P as incidence
structure. The pair {x, y}, x ∈ P , y ∈ L such that xIy is called a flag of
incidence structure I.
Let K be a finite commutative ring. We refer to an incidence structure
with a point set P = Ps,m = K
s+m and a line set L = Lr,m = K
r+m as
linguistic incidence structure Im if point
(x) = (x1, x2, . . . , xs, , xs+1, xs+2, . . . , xs+m)
is incident to line
[y] = [y1, y2, . . . , yr, yr+1, yr+2 . . . , yr+m]
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if and only if the following relations hold
ξ1xs+1 + ζ1yr+1 = f1(x1, x2, . . . , xs, y1, y2, . . . , yr)
ξ2xs+2 + ζ2yr+2 = f2(x1, x2, . . . , xs, xs+1, y1, y2, . . . , yr, yr+1)
. . .
ξmxs+m + ζmyr+m = fm(x1, x2, . . . , xs+m−1, y1, y2, . . . , yr+m−1)
where ξj and ζj , j = 1, 2, . . . ,m are not zero divisors, and fj are multi-
variate polynomials with coefficients from K. Brackets and parenthesis
allow us to distinguish poins from lines (see [7]).
The colour ρ(x) = ρ((x)) (ρ(y) = ρ([y])) of point (x) (line [y]) is
defined as projection of an element (x) ([y]) from a free module on its
initial s (relatively r) coordinates. As it follows from the definition of
linguistic incidence structure for each vertex of incidence graph there
exists unique neighbour of a chosen colour. We also consider a linguistic
incidence structures defined by infinite number of equations.
Let M = {m1,m2, . . . ,md} be a subset of {1, 2, . . .m} (set of indexes
for equations), d 6 m with the standard order. Assume that equations
indexed by elements from M of following kind
ξm1xm1 + ζm1ym1 = fm1(x1, x2, . . . , xs, y1, y2, . . . , yr)
ξm2xm2 + ζm2ym2 = fm2(x1, x2, . . . , xs, xm1y1, y2, . . . , yr, ym1)
. . .
ξmdxmd + ζmdymd = fmd(x1, . . . , xs, xm1 , . . . , xmd−1 , y1, . . . , yr, ym1 , . . . , ymd−1)
define another linguistic incidence structure IM . Then the natural projec-
tions
π1 : (x)→ (x1, x2, . . . , xs, xm1 , xm2 , . . . , xmd),
π2 : [y]→ [y1, y2, . . . , yr, ym1 , ym2 , . . . , ymd ]
of free modules define the natural homomorphism φ of incidence structure
Im onto IM . We will use the same symbol ρ for the colouring of linguistic
graph IM . It is clear, that ρ(x) = ρ(φ(x)) and ρ(y) = ρ(φ(y)). So, φ is a
colour preserving homomorphism of incidence structure(bipartite graph)
onto the other one. We refer to φ as symplectic homomorphism and graph
IM = φ(Im) as symplectic quotient of linguistic graph Im. In the case of
linguistic graphs defined by infinite number of equations we may consider
cases of symplectic quotients defined by the infinite subset M .
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The triangular structure of the system of equations insures existence
of many symplectic quotients. Let us consider an example of symplectic
quotient which is not connected with a general triangular structure of a
linguistic incidence system.
Let I be a graph of a linguistic incidence structure with a set of a vertex
set V = P ∪ L over a commutative ring K. We introduce the adjacency
relation FI on the set of flags F(V ) of incidence structure I as a flag
relation (or flag linguistic graph): the intersection of two distinct flags is a
non empty set (singleton). All vertices forming two flags F1 = {(x1), [y1]}
and F2 = {(x2), [y2]} could be located at the same connected component
of I, or all of them are from distinct connected components of I. Assume
that system of equations
G1(x) = g1,
G2(x) = g2,
. . . ,
Gt(x) = gt,
where gi ∈ K are some constants, defines the connectivity invariants
specified for points (x) ∈ P in linguistic incidence structure I. For elements
(x1), (x2) ∈ P from the same connectivity component in grpah I the
following relations hold
Gi(x1) = Gi(x2), i = 1, 2, . . . , t.
The existence of i such that Gi(x1) 6= Gi(x2) implies that (x1) and
(x2) are points from different connected components of graph I.
4. Symbolic keys and pseudorandom walks on ﬂag space
Let Vs,r,m = Ps,m ∪ Lr,m, Im = Im(K), m = 2, 3, . . . be a family of
linguistic incidence structures with the point set Ps,m = K
s+m and the
line set Ls,m = K
r+m, where parameters s and r are constants and K
is a fixed commutative ring. The sets of colours for points and lines are
Ks and Kr, respectively. We assume that subset M = {i1, i2, . . . , id},
d = d(m) 6 m defines the symplectic quotient IM for each linguistic
structure Im = Im(K). Let G1, G2, . . . , Gt be connectivity invariants of
incidence structures Im.
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Let FIm be the flag relation and F(Vs,r,m) = F(Vm(K)) be the variety
of flags for incidence structure Im. The information on the flag {(x), [y]}
can be given by the pair (x) ∈ Ks+m, ρ(y) ∈ Kr or, alternatively, by the
pair [y] ∈ Kr+m and ρ(x) ∈ Ks. So, F(Vs,r,m) is isomorphic to K
m+r+s.
Let NP,a, a ∈ K
s be the operator of a change of the point of the flag
F = {(x), [y]} defined by the rule
NP,a({(x), [y]}) = {(x
′), [y]},
where (x′)Im[y] and ρ(x
′) = a. Similarly, NL,a, a ∈ K
s is the operator of
a change of the line of the flag F = {(x), [y]} specified by the rule
NL,b({(x), [y]}) = {(x), [y
′]},
where [y′]Im(x) and ρ(y
′) = b. It is clear that application of the com-
position of NP,a1 , NL,b1 , NP,a2 , NL,b2 , . . . , NP,ak , NL,bk to the flag F
corresponds to the walk in our linguistic graph with the starting point
(p) or the walk in the graph FIm with starting vertex {(x), [y]}.
Let F = {(x), [y]} be a general flag of our linguistic structure Im, i.e.
(x) = (x1, x2, . . . , xs, xs+1, xs+2, . . . , xs+m),
[y] = [y1, y2, . . . , yr, yr+1, yr+2 . . . , yr+m]
are incident. It is convenient for us to shift indeces and write points and
lines as
(x) = (x1, x2, . . . , xs, xs+r+1, xs+r+2, . . . , xs+r+m),
[y] = [ys+1, ys+2, . . . , yr+s, yr+s+1, . . . , ys+r+m].
We assume that our incidence structure has the symplectic quotient IM
corresponding to subset M = {js+r+i1 , js+r+i2 , . . . , js+r+id}. Let π be a
permutation on {1, 2, . . . , s, s+1, s+2, . . . , s+r, s+r+1, s+r+2, . . . , s+
r +m}. Then we can consider deformated incidence structures Ipim with
points
π(x) = (xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . , xpi(s), xpi(s+r+1), xpi(s+r+2), . . . , xpi(s+r+m))
and lines of kind
π(y) = [ypi(s+1), ypi(s+2), . . . , ypi(s+r), ypi(s+r+1), ypi(s+r+2), . . . , ypi(s+r+m)]
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with the incidence conditions
ξ1xpi(s+r+1) + ζ1ypi(s+r+1) = f1(xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . , xpi(s), ypi(s+1), . . . , ypi(s+r))
ξ2xpi(s+r+2) + ζ2ypi(s+r+2) = f2(xpi(1), . . . , xpi(s), xpi(s+r+1), ypi(s+1), . . . ,
ypi(s+r), ypi(s+r+1))
. . .
ξmxpi(s+r+m) + ζmypi(s+r+m) = fm(xpi(1), . . . , xpi(s), xpi(s+r+1), . . . xpi(s+r+m−1),
ypi(s+1),. . . ,ypi(s+r), ypi(s+r+1), . . . , ypi(s+r+m−1))
Obviously linguistic incidence structure Im is isomorphic to I
pi
m and
symplectic quotient IM of graph Im corresponding to subset
M = {r + s+ i1, r + s+ i2, . . . , r + s+ id}
is isomorphic to symplectic quotient IpiM of graph I
pi
m related to the subset
π(M) = {π(r + s+ i1), π(r + s+ i2), . . . , π(r + s+ id)}.
The above mentioned action of symmetric group on linguistic structure
allows us without a loss of generality assume that symplectic quotient
IM of Im corresponds to subset M = {r + s+ 1, r + s+ 2, . . . , r + s+ d}
with natural order of elements. So, the canonical homomorphism of Im
onto IM is given by
(x1, . . . , xs, xr+s, xr+s+1, . . . , xr+s+m)→(x1, . . . , xs, xr+s, xr+s+1, . . . , xr+s+d)
(ys+1, . . . , yr+s, yr+s+1, . . . , yr+s+m)→(ys+1, . . . , yr+s, yr+s+1, . . . , yr+s+d)
We assume that x1, x2, . . . , xs, ys+1, ys+2, . . . , ys+r, xs+r+1, xs+r+2, . . . ,
xs+r+m is the list of independent variables which gives us the entire
information on the flag F of incidence structure Im. We assume that
connectivity invariants G1, G2, . . . , Gt are written in terms of coordinates
of the point (x). We refer to a tuple
Tr(F ) = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xs, ys+1, ys+2, . . . , ys+r, G1(x), G2(x), . . . , Gt(x)〉
as a trace of a flag F = {(x), [y]} i.e.
Tr(F ) = 〈ρ(x), ρ(y), G1(x), G2(x), . . . , Gt(x)〉 .
Let Q be a subring of K, such that K is isomorphic to free module Ql.
We introduce parameter n by equality n = (r+s+t)l (the dimension of flag
variety over commutative ring Q). Assume that Q[z1, z2, . . . , zn]
l is a to-
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tality of all polynomials over Q maps from Qn into K. We choose the fixed
basis in K = Ql and identify a map P from Q[z1, z2, . . . , zn]
l with the set
of polynomials p1(z1, z2, . . . , zn), p2(z1, z2, . . . , zn), . . . , pl(z1, z2, . . . , zn),
where pi are multivariate polynomials from Q[z1, z2, . . . , zn].
Let D1, D2, . . . , Dh, Dh+1 and E1, E2, . . . , Eh be two lists of elements
where Di, Ej ∈ Q[z1, z2, . . . , zn]
l, i = 1, 2, . . . , h + 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , h. We
refer to concatenation of both lists (writing second list after the first one)
as a symbolic key.
We take the flag F = {(x), [y]} specified by parameters of kind x1, x2,
. . . , xs, ys+1, ys+2, . . . , ys+r, xs+r+1, xs+r+2, . . . , xs+r+m with spectrum
Tr(F ) = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xs, ys+1, ys+2, . . . , ys+r, G1(x), G2(x), . . . , Gt(x)〉 .
Each coordinate of the flag F is a tuple of kind (α1, α2, . . . αl) ∈ Q
l.
We concatenate all these tuples with the preservation of order and form
a string of parameters β1, β2, . . . , βn from Q. After that we compute
specializations of coordinates
di = Di(β1, β2, . . . , βn),
where i = 1, 2, . . . , h, h+ 1 and
ej = Ej(β1, β2, . . . , βn),
where j = 1, 2, . . . , h of our symbolic key. Chosen base of Ql = K
allows us to treat coordinates of the string d1, d2, . . . , dh, dh+1 as ele-
ments of Ks and coordinates of e1, e2, . . . , eh as string from K
r. String
(d1, d2, . . . , dh, dh+1, e1, e2, . . . , eh) is our numerical key.
Finally, we compute decomposition N of operators NP,d1 , FL,e1 , NP,d2 ,
NL,e2 , . . . , NP,dh , NL,eh , NP,ed+1 .
The application of N to the flag F corresponds to the walk in graph
FIm with the starting point F and the final point N(F ).
Notice, that the colours of the point and the line forming F ′ = N(F ) =
{(x′), [y′]} are dh+1 ∈ K
s and eh ∈ K
r, respectively. Under certain
conditions we may restore the trace of the flag F from given F ′. We have
Gi(x) = Gi(x
′)
because both flags are from the same connected component. Additionally,
(x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
s) = Dh+1(x1, . . . , xs, ys+1, . . . , ys+r, G1(x
′), . . . , Gt(x
′)),
U. Romańczuk-Polubiec, V. Ustimenko 113
(y′s+1, y
′
s+2, . . . , y
′
s+r) = Eh(x1, . . . , xs, ys+1, . . . , ys+r, G1(x
′), . . . , Gt(x
′)).
We may choose function Dh+1 and Eh such that the above written
system of equations has a unique solution independently from values
Gi(x
′), i = 1, 2, . . . , t.
Obviously the first choice here is a linear in variables x1, x2, . . . ,
xs, ys+1, ys+2, . . . , ys+r system of equations. Then we can reconstruct
our walk in reverse order corresponding to the composition of NP,eh−1 ,
NL,dh−1 , NP,eh−2 , . . . , NL,e1 , NP,d1 .
4.1. Multivariate transformations based on symbolic keys
The above mentioned map defined by symbolic key has multivariate
nature. The plainspace is the totality of tuples
(x1, x2, . . . , xs, y1, y2, . . . , yr, xs+r+1, xs+r+2, . . . , xs+r+m).
For each functionDi(z1,z2,. . . ,zs,zs+1,zs+2,. . . ,zs+r,zs+r+1, . . . ,zs+r+t) we
consider the specialization of variables z1 = x1, z2 = x2, . . . , zs = xs,
zs+1 = y1, zs+2 = y2, . . . , zs+r = yr, zs+r+1 = G1(x), zs+r+2 = G2(x), . . . ,
zs+r+t = Gt(x). In such way we construct function D
′
i depending on the
general tuple (x1, x2, . . . , xs, y1, y2, . . . , yr, xr+s+1, xs+r+2, . . . , xs+r+m) of
the plainspace. Similarly we apply the same specialisation to each Ei
and get transformation E′i. Transformations NP,D′i and NL,E
′
j
are multi-
variate bijections on Kr+s+m. The formal composition of NP,D′
1
, NL,E′
1
,
NP,D′
2
, NL,E′
2
, . . . , NP,D′
h
, NL,E′
h
, NP,D′
h+1
is a symbolic presentation of
the map N .
5. The general algorithms of the two windows multivari-
ate cryptosystem depending on random variables
Suppose that two users Alice and Bob want to communicate securely
over an open channel in which all messages are potentially overheard.
Suppose that Alice and Bob for secure communication the two windows
multivariate cryprosystem depending of random parameters; so, Alice
generates a couple of keys (public and private ones). We show that lack
of knowledge of the private key prevents Bob or possible intruders to
decrypt intercepted messages.
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5.1. The key generation algorithm
Let us assume that Alice has a flag linguistic graph FIm and flag
symplectic quotient FIM corresponding toM = {s+r+1, s+r+2, . . . , s+
r+d} with natural order of elements.. So, the windows spaceW =W1⊕W2
of flags can be identified with tuples
F =(x1, x2, . . . , xs, ys+1, ys+2, . . . , ys+r, xs+r+1, xs+r+2, . . . , xs+r+d,
xs+r+d+1xs+r+d+2, . . . , xs+r+m).
It is convenient for Alice to partite Kr+s+m into direct sumW1 = K
s+r+d
and W2 = K
m−d. She fixes the basis and identifies “two windows spaces”
W1 (window for plaintext) and W2 (window for random extention of
plaintext) with totalities of tuples of kind
(x1, x2, . . . , xs, ys+1, ys+2, . . . , ys+r, xs+r+1, xs+r+2, . . . , xs+r+d) ∈W1,
(xs+r+d+1, xs+r+d+2, . . . , xs+r+m) ∈W2.
She will choose the permutation π to deformate the flag linguistic
graph FIm and its flag symplectic quotient
FIM . Alice will use the fact
that K = Ql. So, she can work with fixed base of K = Ql and identify
W , W1 and W2 with free modules over Q of dimensions (s + r + m)l,
(s+ r + d)l and (m− d)l, respectively.
We can now discribe an algorithm of key generation for our two
windows multivariate cryptosystem depending on random variables.
Key generation. Alice should do the following steps:
1) Choose the comutative ring Q and their extention K = Ql.
2) Define space W = Qk, where k = (s + r +m)l and fixe the base
and consider the decomposition W = W1 ⊗W2, where W1 = Q
k1 ,
W2 = Q
k2 , k1 = (s+ r + d)l and k2 = (m− d)l.
3) Choose the most preferable singular linear transformation T1 :W →
W such that T1|W1 = T is not singular.
4) Take the tuple z = (z1, z2, . . . , zk) ∈W an compute w = T1(z).
5) Treat tuple w ∈W as a flag F1 in linguistic graph
FIm of kind
F1 = (x1, . . . , xs, ys+1, . . . , ys+r, xs+r+1, xs+r+2, . . . , xs+r+m)
6) Take permutation π defined on set of indexes {1, 2, . . . , s+ r +m}
to deformate linguistic graph FIm.
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7) Compute flag F2 ∈
F Ipim with the trace x
′
1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
s, y
′
s+1, . . . ,
y′s+r, G1(F2), G2(F2), . . . , Gt(F2) i.e.
F2 = π(F1) = (x
′
1, x
′
2 . . . , x
′
s, y
′
s+1, . . . , y
′
s+r, x
′
s+r+1, x
′
s+r+2, . . . , x
′
s+r+m)
8) Choose the symbolic key corresponding to the symbolic way in lin-
guistic graph FIpim i.e. list of polynomial functionsDi(v1,v2,. . .,vr+s+t),
i = 1, 2, . . . , h+ 1, Ej(v1, v2, . . . , vr+s+t), j = 1, 2, . . . , h .
9) Compute specializations
D′i(F2) = Di(x
′
1, . . . , x
′
s, y
′
s+1, . . . , y
′
s+r, G1(F2), . . . , Gt(F2)),
i = 1, 2, . . . , h+ 1,
E′j(F2) = Ej(x
′
1, . . . , x
′
s, y
′
s+1, . . . , y
′
s+r, G1(F2), . . . , Gt(F2)),
j = 1, 2, . . . , h.
corresponding to the substitution vi = x
′
i, i+1, 2, . . . , s, vs+j = y
′
s+j ,
j = 1, 2, . . . , r, vs+r+e = Gi(F2), e = 1, 2, . . . , t.
10) Determine multivariate transformation N corresponding to chosen
symbolic key, i.e.
N = NP,D′
1
NL,E′
1
. . . NP,D′
h
NL,E′
h
NP,D′
h+1
.
11) Compute flag F3 = N(F2) of the graph
FIpim.
12) Treat the flag F3 as a tuple u ∈ Q
k.
13) Choose a invartible affine transformation T2 : Q
k → Qk and compute
c = T2(u).
14) Using symbolic computation determine a multivariate transforma-
tions H :W →W as a composition of T , N and T2. It is clear that
the transformation H :W →W is polynomial over Q of kind
z1 → h1(z1, z2, . . . , zk),
z2 → h2(z1, z2, . . . , zk),
. . . ,
zk → hk(z1, z2, . . . , zk), where hi ∈ Q[z1, z2, . . . , zk].
It implies that the public key of presented cryptosystem includes the
following:
(1) The commutative ring Q including its additive and multiplicative
structure.
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(2) The subdivision of the text space W = Qk into the direct sum of
W1 = Q
k1 as window plaintext and W2 = Q
k2 as window random
extention of plaintext.
(3) The transformation H :W →W defined by the list of multivariate
polynomials h1,h2,. . . , hk ∈ Q[z1, z2, . . . , zk].
The private key includes:
(1) Information about the structures of ring K isomorphic to free
module Ql and the fact that k = (s + r +m)l, k1 = (s + r + d)l,
k2 = (m− d)l.
(2) Singular linear transformation T1 :W →W such that T1|W1 = T is
not singular.
(3) Flag linguistic graph FIm and its symplectic quotient
FIM corre-
sponding to subset M = {js+r+i1 , js+r+i2 , . . . , js+r+id}.
(4) Permutation π defined on {1, 2, . . . , s+ r +m}
(5) Deformed linguistic incidence structure FIpim of
FIm and deformed
symplectic quotient FIpiM of graph
FIM , where
M = {r + s+ i1, r + s+ i2, . . . , r + s+ id}
and
π(M) = {π(r + s+ i1), π(r + s+ i2), . . . , π(r + s+ id)}.
(6) Symbolic key as list of transformations D1, D2, Dh+1, E1, E2, . . . ,
Eh and its specializations D
′
1, D
′
2, D
′
h+1, E
′
1, E
′
2, . . . , E
′
h determines
multivariate transformation N corresponding to way in graph FIpim
i.e.
N = NP,D′
1
NL,E′
1
. . . NP,D′
h
NL,E′
h
NP,D′
h+1
.
(7) An invariable affine transformation T2 :W →W .
5.2. Encryption and decryption algorithm
Suppose that Bob encrypts a message (plaintext) m for Alice, which
Alice decrypt.
Encryption. Bob should do the following steps:
1) Obtain Alice’s authentical public key (Q, k, k1, k2, H).
2) Represent the message m as a tuple from the window plaintext
W1 = Q
k1 .
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3) Choose a random extention v of plaintext m form W2 = Q
k2 and
make concatenation m and v i.e. m˜ = m||v.
4) Compute H(m˜) = c.
5) Send the ciphertext c to Alice.
Decryption. To restore the plaintext m from the ciphertext c, Alice
should do the following steps:
1) Use the invertible affine transformation T2 to compute T
−1
2 (c) = u.
2) Write u as a flag F3 from graph
FIpim.
3) Use symbolic key and trace of flag F3 to determine a numerical key
as list of elements d1, d2, . . . , dh,dh+1, e1, e2, . . . , eh from K.
4) Compute N−1(F3) = F2 via computation of reverse walk in
FIpim
determined by numerical key.
5) Compute F1 = π
−1(F2) as flag from
FIm.
6) Get projections of flag F1 onto flag F from symplectic quotient
FIM
of flag linguistic graph FIm.
7) Write flag F as a tuple z from W1 = Q
k1 .
8) Compute plaintext m = T−1(z).
We will show the existence of families of linguistic graphs, for which
we can estimate polynomial complexity of the algorithms for both corre-
spondents and present certain arguments on security.
6. On the family of graphs of large girth
with special symplectic quotients
Let PD and LD be two copies of Cartesian power K
N, where K is the
commutative ring and N is the set of positive integer numbers. Elements
of PD will be called points and those of LD lines.
To distinguish points from lines we use parentheses and brackets. If
x ∈ V , then (x) ∈ PD and [x] ∈ LD. It will be also advantageous to adopt
the notation for co-ordinates of points and lines introduced in [30] for the
case of general commutative ring K:
(p) = (p0,1, p1,1, p1,2, p2,1, p2,2, p
′
2,2, p2,3, . . . , pi,i, p
′
i,i, pi,i+1, pi+1,i, . . .),
[l] = [l1,0, l1,1, l1,2, l2,1, l2,2, l
′
2,2, l2,3, . . . , li,i, l
′
i,i, li,i+1, li+1,i, . . .].
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The elements of P and L can be thought as infinite ordered tuples of
elements from K, such that only finite number of components are different
from zero.
Now we define a linguistic incidence structure (PD, LD, ID) defined
by infinite system of equations as follows. We say that the point (p) is
incident with the line [l], and we write (p)I[l], if the following relations
between their co-ordinates hold:
li,i − pi,i = l1,0pi−1,i,
l′i,i − p
′
i,i = li,i−1p0,1,
li,i+1 − pi,i+1 = li,ip0,1,
li+1,i − pi+1,i = l1,0p
′
i,i
(2)
(These four relations are defined for i > 1, p′1,1 = p1,1, l
′
1,1 = l1,1). The
incidence structure (PD, LD, ID) we denote as D(K). Now we speak of
the incidence graph of (PD, LD, ID), which has the vertex set PD ∪ LD
and edge set consisting of all pairs {(p), [l]} for which (p)I[l].
For each positive integer k > 2 we obtain a symplectic quotient
(PD,k, LD,k, ID,k) as follows. First, PD,k and LD,k are obtained from PD
and LD, respectively, by simply projecting each vector into its k initial
coordinates. The incidence ID,k is then defined by imposing the first
k−1 incidence relations and ignoring all others. The incidence graph
corresponding to the structure (PD,k, LD,k, ID,k) is denoted by D(k,K).
To facilitate notation in the future results on “connectivity invariants”,
it will be convenient for us to define p−1,0 = l0,−1 = p1,0 = l0,1 = 0,
p0,0 = l0,0 = −1, p
′
0,0 = l
′
0,0 = −1, p
′
1,1 = p1,1, l
′
1,1 = l1,1) and to assume
that our equations are defined for i > 0.
Notice, that for i = 0, the written above four conditions are satisfied
by every point and line, and for i = 1 the first two equations coincide and
give l1,1 − p1,1 = l1,0p0,1.
Let k > 6, t = [(k + 2)/4], and let u = (uα, u11, · · · , utt, u
′
tt,
ut,t+1, ut+1,t, · · · ) be a vertex of D(k,K) (α ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}, it does not
matter whether u is a point or a line). For every r, 2 6 r 6 t, let
ar = ar(u) =
∑
i=0,r
(uiiu
′
r−i,r−i − ui,i+1ur−i,r−i−1),
and a = a(u) = (a2, a3, · · · , at). Similarly, we assume a = a(u) =
(a2, a3, · · · , at, . . . ) for the vertex u of infinite graph D(K).
U. Romańczuk-Polubiec, V. Ustimenko 119
Let ηk (η) be the equivalence relation:
uηkv ⇔ a(u) = a(v) (uηv ⇔ a(u) = a(v))
on the vertex set of graph D(k,K) (D(K)), respectively .
Proposition 2 ([37]). Let K be the commutative ring.
(i) For any t′ − 1 ring elements xi ∈ K, 2 6 t
′ 6 [(k + 2)/4], there
exists a vertex v of D(k,K) for which a(v) = (x2, . . . , xt′) = (x).
(ii) The equivalence class Ck for the equivalence relation ηk on the set
K
k ∪Kk is isomorphic to the affine variety Kt ∪Kt , t = [4/3k] + 1
for k = 0, 2, 3 mod 4, k = [4/3n] + 2 for k = 1 mod 4.
(iii) the vertex set Ck is the union of several connected components of
D(k,K).
Let C be the equivalence class on η on the vertex set D(K), then the
induced subgraph with the vertex set C is the union of several connected
components of D(K).
We shall use notation C(t,K) (C(K)) for the induced subgraph of
D(k,K) (D(K)) with the vertex set Ck (vertex set C, respectively).
The graph C(t,K) in the case of K = Fq, q is odd, coincides with
CD(k, q) which was introduced in [15].
The following statement was proven in [39].
Theorem 1. Let K be commutative ring with unity of characteristic d,
d 6= 2. Then graphs C(t,K), t > 2 and C(K) are connected.
If K = Fq, q is odd, then the graph C(Fq) is a q-regular tree. In cases
char(K) = 2 the questions of the description of connected components of
C(t,K) and C(K) are open.
Below we consider the family of infinite linguistic graphs A(K) formed
by quotients of D(K) where K is a commutative ring.
Let PA and LA be two copies of Cartesian power K
N, where K is the
commutative ring and N is the set of positive integer numbers. Elements
of PA will be called points and those of LA lines.
To distinguish points from lines we use parentheses and brackets. If
x ∈ V , then (x) ∈ PA and [x] ∈ LA. It will be also advantageous to adopt
the notation for co-ordinates of points and lines introduced in [23] for the
case of a general commutative ring K:
(p) = (p0,1, p1,1, p1,2, p2,2, p2,3, . . . , pi,i, pi,i+1, . . .),
[l] = [l1,0, l1,1, l1,2, l2,2, l2,3, . . . , li,i, li,i+1, . . .].
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The elements of PA and LA can be thought of as infinite ordered
tuples of elements from K, such that only a finite number of components
are different from zero.
Now we define an incidence structure (PA, LA, IA) as follows. We say
that the point (p) is incident with the line [l], and we write (p)IA[l], if
the following relations between their co-ordinates hold:
li,i − pi,i = l1,0pi−1,i,
li,i+1 − pi,i+1 = li,ip0,1
The incidence structure (PA, LA, IA) we denote as A(K). It is
clear that the set od indices {(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 3), . . . ,
(i− 1, i), (i, i), . . .} is a subset in {(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 2)′,
. . . , (i− 1, i), (i, i− 1), (i, i), (i, i)′, . . .)}. So graph A(K) is a symplectic
quotient of linguistic incidence structure D(K).
For each positive integer k > 2 we obtain a symplectic quotient
(PA,k, LA,k, IA,k) as follows. First, PA,k and LA,k are obtained from PA
and LA respectively by simply projecting each vector into its k initial
coordinates with the respect to the above order. The incidence IA,k is then
defined by imposing the first k−1 incidence equations and ignoring all oth-
ers. The incidence graph corresponding to the structure (PA,k, LA,k, IA,k)
is denoted by A(k,K).
For each positive integer k > 2 we consider the standard symplectic
projection φA,k of (PA,k, LA,k, IA,k) onto (PA,k−1, LA,k−1, IA,k−1) defined
as simple projection of each vector from PA,k and LA,k onto its k − 1
initial coordinates with respect to the above order. It is clear that A(2,K)
and A(3,K) coincides with the D(2,K) and D(3,K), respectively.
Proposition 3. Graph A(2n + 2,K) is a symplectic quotient of the
linguistic graph D(4n+ 1,K), n > 2, and A(2n+ 3,K) is a symplectic
quotient of D(4n+ 3).
Proof. We can arrange indices for points and lines of D(4n+ 3,K), as
{(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 3), . . . , (n + 1, n + 1), (n+ 1, n+ 2),
(2, 1), (2, 2)′, (3, 2), (3, 3)′, . . . (n+ 1, n), (n+ 1, n+ 1)′}. So the projection
of a point and a line onto the first 2m+ 3 coordinates is the symplectic
homomorphism. In the case of k = 4n + 1 one can partite the set of
indices into disjoint union of {(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), . . . ,
(n, n+ 1), (n+ 1, n+ 1)} and {(2, 1), (2, 2)′, (3, 2), . . . , (n, n)′, (n+ 1, n)}.
So, the projection of the point and the line onto first set contains 2n+ 2
coordinates is a symplectic homomorphism.
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Notice, that graphs of kindD(4n+3,K) have n connectivity invariants
a2, a3, . . . , an, an+1 and graphs D(4n + 1,K) have n − 1 connectivity
invariants a2, a3, . . . , an.
The free module K4n+2 (totality of flags for D(4n + 1,K)) can be
identified with the totality of functions {f : ΩD,4n+1 → K}. The natural
base is formed by functions eh, h ∈ ΩD,4n+1 such that eh(x) = 1 for
x = h and eh(x) = 0 otherwise. Tuple (z0,1, z1,0, . . . , zn+1,n+1) is a linear
combination of eh, h ∈ ΩD,4n+1, where ΩD,4n+1 is set of indexes with an
order given in the following way
((1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 2)′, (2, 3), (3, 2), (3, 3), . . . ,
(n, n)′, (n, n+ 1), (n+ 1, n), (n+ 1, n+ 1))
7. The examples of cryptosystems
with complexity estimates
We give examples of linguistic graphs and related symbolic keys, which
can be used in above described cryptosystem. More specifically, in our
examples we will use a pair of graphs D(4n + 1,K) and A(2n + 2,K)
corresponding to the incidence structures (PD,4n+1, LD,4n+1, ID,4n+1) and
(PA,2n+1, LA,2n+2, IA,2n+2) defined over a commutative ring K (case of
pair D(4n+3), A(2n+3) is very similar). Recall, that graph D(4n+1,K)
have a connectivity invariants G1 = a2, G2 = a3, . . . , Gt = an, where
t = n− 1. The deformated graph has same connectivity invariants.
We assume, that we deal with the deformated linguistic graphs of
kind I = IψD,4n+1, where permutation ψ change the standard order on the
set ΩD,4n+1 in the definition of graph D(4n+ 1,K) determines new set
Ω of elements of ΩD,4n+1 with the order of elements (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1),
(1, 2), (2, 2), . . . , (n, n+1), (n+1, n+1), (2, 1), (2, 2)′, (3, 2), . . . , (n, n)′,
(n+1, n). The homomorphism of deformated flag systems for D(4n+1,K)
and A(2n+ 2,K) is just projections of tuples of length 4n+ 2 onto their
initial 2n+ 3 coordinates.
More specifically, at the beginning we work with flag linguistic graphs
FIψD,4n+1 and
FIψA,2n+2 and next we deal with
FID,4n+1 and
FIψA,2n+2 .
First, Alice works with flag F1 ∈
F IψD,4n+1, which corresponds to
concatenation of tuples
m′ = (y1,0, x0,1, x1,1, x1,2, x2,2, . . . , xn,n+1, xn+1,n+1) ∈
F IψA,M
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(it corresponds to plaintext m) and
v′ = (x2,1, x
′
2,2, x2,3, . . . , x
′
n,n, x
′
n+1,n+1)
(it corresponds to random extention of plaintext v).
Next, she works with flag F2 = {(x), [y]} ∈
F ID,4n+1, where ρ(x) =
x0,1, ρ(y) = y1,0 and
(x) = (x0,1, x1,1, x1,2, x2,1, x2,2, . . . , x
′
n,n, xn,n+1, xn+1,n, xn+1,n+1).
i.e. F2 corresponds to the tuple
(x0,1, y1,0, x1,1, x1,2, x2,1, x2,2, . . . , x
′
n,n, xn,n+1, xn+1,n, xn+1,n+1).
Moreover, in this case we haveW = K4n+1,W1 = K
2n+2 W2 = K
2n−1 and
the permutation π = ψ−1 on the set of indices Ω defines π(Ω) = ΩD,4n+1.
Example 1. For the simplicity, we assume that K = Ql and l = 1. Alice
chooses two pseudorandom sequences of ring elements α1, α2, . . . , αh+1
and β1, β2, . . . , βh. She forms the symbolic key as Di(z1, z2, . . . , zt+1) =
z1 + αi, i = 1, 2, . . . , h + 1, and Ei(z1, z2, . . . , zt+1) = z2 + βi, i =
1, 2, . . . , h + 1. Next, she computes its specializations D′i(x0,1) = x0,1 +
αi, i = 1, 2, . . . , h+ 1, E
′
j(y1,0) = y1,0 + βj , j = 1, 2, . . . , h, corresponding
to the substitution z1 = x0,1, z2 = y1,0 and determines the transformation
N = NP,D′
1
NL,E′
1
NP,D′
2
NL,E′
2
. . . NP,D′
h
NL,E′
h
NP,D′
h+1
for the flag incidence system FID,4n+2. She executes by the tools of
Computer Algebra the following transformation on K4n+2. She com-
putes H as a composition of maps T , ψ−1, N and T2, where W1 is
invariant subspace of T . Recall that W1 is a totality of w such that
w2,1 = 0, w
′
2,2 = 0, w3,2 = 0, . . . , w
′
n,n = 0, wn+1,n = 0. It means that T1 is
a linear transformation of kind
z0,1 → t0,1(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, z1,2, z2,2 . . . , zn,n+1, zn+1,n+1)
z1,0 → t0,1(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, z1,2, z2,2 . . . , zn,n+1, zn+1,n+1)
z1,1 → t1,1(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, z1,2, z2,2 . . . , zn,n+1, zn+1,n+1)
z1,2 → t1,2(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, z1,2, z2,2 . . . , zn,n+1, zn+1,n+1)
z2,2 → t2,2(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, z1,2, z2,2 . . . , zn,n+1, zn+1,n+1)
. . .
zn,n+1 → tn,n+1(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, z1,2, z2,2 . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1)
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zn+1,n+1 → tn+1,n+1(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, z1,2, z2,2 . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1)
z2,1 → t2,1(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
z′2,2 → t
′
2,2(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
z3,2 → t3,2(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
. . .
z′n,n → tn,n(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
zn+1,n → tn+1,n(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
where tβ, β ∈ Ω are linear forms.
After the multiplication of vector z from the right on permutational
matrix corresponding to ψ−1 = π Alice gets the string of expressions
tψ(β), written in accordance with the initial order on Ω (see the definition
of graph D(4n + 1,K)). So, new tuple can be treated in natural way
as a flag of D(4n+ 1,K). After the application of N acting on flags of
D(4n+ 1,K) tuple tβ will be transformed in
fβ(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n).
So, Alice will get the transformation in the form
zα → fpi(α)(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n),
where α ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 2)′, (2, 3), (3, 2),
(3, 3), . . . , (n, n)′, (n, n+ 1), (n+ 1, n), (n+ 1, n+ 1)}. The final transfor-
mation will change zα on certain linear combination of zβ , β ∈ Ω and we
get the list of public rules
z0,1 → h0,1(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
z1,0 → h0,1(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
z1,1 → h1,1(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
. . .
zn,n+1 → hn,n+1(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
zn+1,n+1 → hn+1,n+1(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1,. . . ,zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2,. . . ,z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
z2,1 → h2,1(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
. . .
z′n,n → hn,n(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
zn+1,n → hn+1,n(z0,1, z1,0, z1,1, . . . , zn,n+1zn+1,n+1z2,1, z
′
2,2, . . . , z
′
n,n, zn+1,n)
We can prove that the transformation is a cubical map.
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Notice that complexity of the use of this multivariate encryption H
for Bob can be estimated via complexity of computation of the value
of general cubical map in 4n+ 2 variables in given point of affine space
K4n+2. So, it equals (4n+ 2)4 (or O(n4)).
The complexity of decryption for Alice is different. We assume that
Alice has already computed invertible matrices. She needs to compute the
value of two linear maps in given vector. It takes O(n2) elementary steps.
The computation of N−1 takes O(nh), where 2h+ 1 is the length of the
walk on the graph. In practical case when h = O(m) the complexity of
decryption procedure is O(n2). Notice, that if matrices are sparse ( number
of nonzero parameters for each row or column as well as parameter h are
bounded by independent constant) the complexity of decryption is O(n).
Example 2. We generalise the previous example in the following way. Let
a2(x), a3(x), . . . , an−1(x) be the list of invariants of the graphD(4n+1,K).
Alice chooses function f(z1, z2, z3, . . . , zn) ∈ K[z1, z2, z3, . . . , zn] with the
property: for all tuples (b2, . . . , bn+1) ∈ K
n+1 the equation
f(z1, b2, b3, . . . , bn+1) = a
has a unique solution z1 = α ∈ K (the free module K
4n+2 can be
substituted for submanifold M isomorphic to Reg(K))K4n+1 consisting
of tuples such that y1,0 belongs to the totality Reg(K) of all invertible
elements of finite commutative ring K).
Alice computes f(x0,1, y1,0, a2(x), a3(x), . . . , an−1(x)) = g(x, y1,0),
She chooses pseudorandom parameters α1,α2, . . . ,αh+1 and β1, β2, . . . ,
βh (or two random tuples generated by Quantum Computer) and generates
the specialised symbolic key as D′i(x0,1, y1,0, a2(x), a3(x), . . . , an−1(x)) =
g(x, y1,0) + αi, i = 1, 2, . . . , h+ 1, E
′
j(y1,0) = y1,0 + βj , j = 1, 2, . . . , h, and
determines multivariate transformation N .
We can evaluate degree of N as 3deg (g(x, y1,0)).
Examples of some functions g of small degree:
(a) g(x, y1,0) = x0,1y1,0 +λ2a2(x)+λ3a3(x)+ · · ·+λn−1an−1(x). Recall,
that we may use manifold M of all tuples, where y1,0 is a regular
element of ringK. Alice can use the pseudorandom (or even random)
sequence λi for construction of the map.
(b) g(x, y1,0) = x
3
0,1+y1,0(λ2a2(x)+λ3a3(x)+ . . . λn−1an−1(x))+αy
2
1,0+
βy1,0+γ. We assume that the ringK is chosen such that the equation
z3 = a has a unique solution in variable z.
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Let us assume that deg(g(x, y1,0)) = d. Then Bob can encrypt for
polynomial time O(m3d+1). The complexity of decryption for Alice now
is maximum of complexities of computation of g(x, y1,0) and O(n
2). Let
us take a “sparse” polynomial expression g(x, y1,0), i.e. the multivariate
polynomial, which can be computed for O(n2) elementary steps. Then
the complexity of decryption for Alice will be still O(n2).
It is easy to generalise above written examples for the case K = Ql
with l > 1.
Example 3. Let us consider the case K = Ql, where Q is some subring
K. We fix the base and write ring element as (x1, x2, . . . , xl). Assume
that the product of two (x1, x2, . . . , xl) and (y1, y2, . . . , yl) is given by
quadratic polynomial map h : K l×K l → K l like in case K = Q[x]/m(x),
where m(x) is a polynomial map from Q[x] of degree l.
So, we choose polynomial g(z11 , z
2
1 , . . . z
l
1, z
1
2 , z
2
2 , . . . z
l
2, . . . , z
1
t+1,
z2t+1, . . . z
l
t+1) in l(t+ 2) variables over Q instead of function f as in
the previous algorithm.
A nice example can be obtained as
g(x, ρ(y))=(ρ(x)A−ρ(x))×ρ(y)+a2(x)A2+a3(x)A3+. . . an−1(x)An−1+d,
where A is a matrix without eigenvalue 1, ρ(x) = (x10,1, x
2
0,1, . . . x
l
0,1) ∈ Q
l,
ρ(y) = (y11,0, y
2
1,0, . . . , y
l
1,0) ∈ Q
l, ai(x) ∈ Q
l, matrices Ai,i > 2 correspond
to arbitrary maps of Ql into itself, d ∈ Ql.
In that case Bob can also encrypt for polynomial time from parameter
n and Alice can decrypt essentially faster.
8. Remarks and Conclusion
The idea of the usage of symbolic keys in the case of D(n, q) based
encryption was considered in [30]. General multivariate maps based on
symbolic key for a linguistic graph as cryptographical tools was proposed
in [31]. Degree estimates of multivariate maps on the flag space of D(n,K)
corresponding to symbolic key of kind x0,1 + αi, y1,0 + βi, i = 1, 2, . . . k,
where αi and βi are constants from K were obtained in [44] (see also
[43]). Discussions of computer simulations of D(n,K) or A(n,K) based
algorithms for different cases of rings on the symbolic level or private keys
algorithms the reader can find in [7], [8], [10], [11], [12]. Time evaluation
of public rule generation, time execution of private key decryption, mixing
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properties of encryption, results of order evaluation for bijection encryption
maps can be found there. The descryption of connectivity invariants ai,
i = 2, 3 . . . of D(n, q), the reader can find in [15], their generalisation
for arbitrary commutative ring are given in [27], [35]. In the case of odd
characteristics connectivity invariants give a full descryption of actual
connected components. This fact is proven in [37]. If charK = 2 then ai
does not give us complete list of invariants (counterexample for K = F2
is discussed in [29]).
The generalisation of private key algorithm on Schubert incidence
structures of arbitrary rank is presented in [40].
The main topic of current paper is a presentation of graph based
multivariate cryptosystems which use nonbijective maps. So straight
forward linearisation attacks are not formally applicable there.
Authors were the participants of the International Algebraic Conference
dedicated to 100-th anniversary of l. A. Kaluzhnin (July 7-12, 2014, Kyiv,
Ukraine). Our paper is dedicated to the memory of Lev Kaluznin and his
achievements in Mathematics.
References
[1] Bollobás B.: Extremal Graph Theory, Academic Press, London (1978).
[2] Braeken A., Wolf C., Prenel B.: A study of the security of Unbalanced Oil and
Vinegar Signature Schemes, ESAT-COSIC (2004).
[3] Bulygin S., Petzoldt A., Buchmann J.: Towards provable security of the unbalanced
oil and vinegar signature scheme under direct attacks. In Guang Gong and Kishan
Chand Gupta, editors, Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2010, volume 6498
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 17-32 (2010).
[4] Ding J., Gower J. E., Schmidt D. S.: Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystems, 260.
Springer, Advances in Information Security, v. 25, (2006).
[5] Kipnis A., Shamir A.: Cryptanalisis of the Oil and Vinegar Signature Scheme,
Advances in Cryptology - Crypto 96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, v. 1462,
257-266 (1996).
[6] Kipnis. A. Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Signature Scheme - extended version,
Euro-Crypt (1999).
[7] Klisowski M., Ustimenko V.: On the Comparison of Cryptographical Properties
of Two Diﬀerent Families of Graphs with Large Cycle Indicator, Mathematics in
Computer Science, Volume 6, Number 2, 181-198 (2012).
[8] Klisowski M., Romańczuk U., Ustimenko V.: On the implementation of cubic
public keys based on new family of algebraic graphs, Annales UMCS Informatica,
AI XI, Number 2, 127-14 (2011).
[9] Koblitz N.: Algebraic aspects of cryptography. Algorithms and Computation in
Mathematics, vol. 3, Springer (1998).
U. Romańczuk-Polubiec, V. Ustimenko 127
[10] Kotorowicz J. S., Ustimenko V.: On the properties of stream ciphers based on
extremal directed graphs, Cryptography Research Perspective (Roland E. Chen,
ed.), Nova Science Publishers, 125-141 (2009).
[11] Kotorowicz, S., Ustimenko V.: On the implementation of cryptoalgorithms based
on algebraic graphs over some commutative rings, Condens. Matter Phys. 11, no.
2(54), 347–360 (2008).
[12] Kotorowicz J. S., Romańczuk U., Ustimenko V.: On the implementation of stream
ciphers based on a new family of algebraic graphs, IEEE Computer Society Press,
Proceedings of the Conference CANA, FedSCIS, 485-490 (2011).
[13] Lazebnik F., Ustimenko V.: Explicit construction of graphs with an arbitrary large
girth and of large size, Discrete Appl. Math. , 60, 275-284 (1995).
[14] Lazebnik F., Ustimenko V. A., A. J. Woldar A. J.: New Series of Dense Graphs of
High Girth, Bull (New Series) of AMS, v.32, N1, 73-79 (1995).
[15] Lazebnik F., Ustimenko V. A.,Woldar A. J.: A Characterization of the Components
of the graphs D(k, q), Discrete Mathematics, 157, 271-283 (1996).
[16] Patarn J.: The Oil i Vinegar digital signatures, Presented at Dagstuhl Workshop
on Cryptography (1997).
[17] Petzoldt A., Bulygin S., Buchmann J.: Cyclicrainbow - a multivariate signature
scheme with a partially cyclic public key. In Guang Gong and KishanChand Gupta,
editors, Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2010, volume 6498 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, 33-48 (2010).
[18] Petzoldt A., Bulygin S., Buchmann J.: Fast veriﬁcation for improved versions of the
uov and rainbow signature schemes. In Philippe Gaborit, editor, Post-Quantum
Cryptography, volume 7932 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 188-202 (2014).
[19] Romańczuk U., Ustimenko V.:, On the key exchange with matrices of large order
and graph based nonlinear maps, Proceedings of the conference Applications of
Computer Algebra, Vlora, Special Issue, Vol .4, N 4, 203-211 (2010)
[20] Romańczuk U., Ustimenko V.: On the family of cubical multivariate cryptosystems
based on the algebraic graph over ﬁnite commutative rings of characteristic 2,
Annales UMCS Informatica AI XII,N 3, 89-106 (2012).
[21] Romańczuk U., Ustimenko V.: On the key exchange with new cubical maps based
on graphs, Annales UMCS Informatica, vol. 4, N 11, 11-19 (2011).
[22] Romańczuk U., Ustimenko V.: On regular forests given in terms of algebraic
geometry, new families of expanding graphs with large girth and Multivariate
cryptographical algorithms, Proceedings of International conference “Applications
of Computer Algebra”, Malaga, 144-147 (2013).
[23] Romańczuk U., Ustimenko V. A.: On the family of cubical multivariate cryptosys-
temsbased on exceptional extremal graphs, Third International Conference on
Symbolic Computations and Cryptography, Castro Urdiales, Extended Abstracts,
169-175 (2012).
[24] Romańczuk U., Ustimenko V.: On families of large cycle matroids, matrices of
large order and key exchange protocols with nonlinear polynomial maps of small
degree, Mathematics in Computer Science, Volume 6, Number 2, 167-180 (2012).
128 On two windows multivariate cryptosystem
[25] Romańczuk-Polubiec U., Ustimenko V.: On new key exchange multivariate pro-
tocols based on pseudorandom walks on incidence structures, Dopovidi National
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 41-49 (2015).
[26] Ustimenko V.: On Multivariate Cryptosystems Based on Computable Maps with
Invertible Decomposition, Annales UMCS, Informatica. Volume 14, Issue 1, Pages
7-17, (2014).
[27] Ustimenko V.: Linear interpretations for ﬂag geometries of Chevalley groups, Ukr.
Math. J., v. 42, no. 3, (in Russian) 383-387 (1990).
[28] Ustimenko V.: Small Schubert cells as subsets in Lie algebras, Functional Analysis
and Applications, v. 25, no. 4, 81-83 (1991).
[29] Ustimenko V.: Coordinatisation of Trees and their Quotients, The “Voronoj’s
Impact on Modern Science”, Kiev, Institute of Mathematics, vol. 2, 125-152 (1998).
[30] Ustimenko V.: On the varieties of parabolic subgroups, their generalisations and
combinatorial applications, Acta Applicandae Mathematicae, 52, 223-238 (1998).
[31] Ustimenko V.: CRYPTIM: Graphs as Tools for Symmetric Encryption, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Springer, v. 2227, 278-287 (2001).
[32] Ustimenko V.: Graphs with Special Arcs and Cryptography, Acta Applicandae
Mathematicae, vol. 74, N2, 117-153 (2002).
[33] Ustimenko V. : Maximality of aﬃne group and hidden graph cryptosystems, J.
Algebra Discrete Math., No 1, 133-150 (2005).
[34] Ustimenko V.: On the cryptographical properties of extreme algebraic graphs,
Algebraic Aspects of Digital Communications, IOS Press (Lectures of Advanced
NATO Institute, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - D: Information
and Communication Security), Volume 24, July, 296 pp. (2009).
[35] Ustimenko V.: Schubert cells in Lie geometries and key exchange via symbolic
computations, Proceedings of the International Conference “Applications of Com-
puter Algebra”, Vlora, Albanian Journal of Mathematics, Special Issue, vol .4 n 4,
135- 145 (2010).
[36] Ustimenko V.: On the extremal graph theory for directed graphs and its crypto-
graphical applications, In: T. Shaska, W.C. Huﬀman, D. Joener and V.Ustimenko,
Advances in Coding Theory and Cryptography, Series on Coding and Cryptology,
vol. 3, 181-200 (2007).
[37] Ustimenko V. A.: Linguistic Dynamical Systems, Graphs of Large Girth and
Cryptography, Journal of Mathematical Sciences, Springer, vol.140, N3, 412-434
(2007).
[38] Ustimenko V. A.: On the graph based cryptography and symbolic computations,
Serdica Journal of Computing, Proceedings of International Conference on Appli-
cation of Computer Algebra, ACA-2006, Varna, N1 (2007).
[39] Ustimenko V. A., Algebraic groups and small world graphs of high girth, Albanian
J. Math., 3 , No. 1, 25-33 (2009).
[40] Ustimenko V. A.: On extremal graph theory and symbolic computations, Dopovidi
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, N2 (in Russian), 42-49 (2013).
U. Romańczuk-Polubiec, V. Ustimenko 129
[41] Ustimenko V. A.: On K-theory of dynamical system, corresponding to graphs
and its applications, Dopovidi National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, N8 (in
Russian), 44-51 (2013).
[42] Ustimenko V.: On walks of variable length in the Schubert systems and multivariate
stream ciphers, Dopovidi National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, N 3, 55-63
(2014).
[43] Ustimenko V., Romańczuk U.: On Dynamical Systems of Large Girth or Cycle
Indicator and their applications to Multivariate Cryptography, Artiﬁcial Intel-
ligence, Evolutionary Computing and Metaheuristics, In the footsteps of Alan
Turing Series: Studies in Computational Intelligence, Vol. 427, Springer, 257-285
(2013).
[44] Ustimenko V., Romańczuk U.: On Extremal Graph Theory, Explicit Algebraic
Constructions of Extremal Graphs and Corresponding Turing Encryption Machines,
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Evolutionary Computing and Metaheuristics, In the footsteps
of Alan Turing Series: Studies in Computational Intelligence, Vol. 427, Springer,
231-256 (2013).
[45] Ustimenko V., Wróblewska A.: On the key exchange with nonlinear polynomial
maps of stable degree, Annalles UMCS Informatica AI X1, 2, 81-93 (2011).
[46] Wróblewska A.: On some properties of graph based public keys, Albanian Journal
of Mathematics, Volume 2, Number 3, NATO Advanced Studies Institute: New
challenges in digital communications, 229-234 (2008).
Contact information
U. Romańczuk-
Polubiec
ul. Ogrodowa 5/19, 17-100 Bielsk Podlaski, Poland
E-Mail(s): urszula_romanczuk@yahoo.pl
V. Ustimenko University of Maria Curie Skłodowska, Pl. Maria
Curie Skłodowska 1, pok. 323, 20-931, Lublin,
Poland
E-Mail(s): vasyl@hektor.umcs.lublin.pl
Received by the editors: 12.03.2015
and in final form 12.03.2015.
